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The Arctic carries some peculiar paradoxes. As a space, it invokes an unusual degree of 
concreteness with its momentous geographical features and the relatively minor human 
presence compared to most other parts of the globe. And yet, at the same time, it is so 
obviously overloaded with cultural and mythological interpretations. On most maps it is 
the ultimate anchor at the top of the globe – and often what the map captures with least 
claim to correctness. Traditional security used to be about the states at the top of the hi-
erarchy of stateness with superpower strategies colliding during the Cold War. Today the 
most important decisions are made in places like Nuuk, the capital of something that is 
sometimes a state, and sometimes prefer not to be one (Wæver 2004; Adler-Nissen and 
Gad 2012). When expanding the security perspective beyond states, the two new forms 
of security that pop up most often in relation to the Arctic are possibly those at opposite 
ends of a time spectrum. One is the most ‘traditional’ in the form of defending Indigenous 
cultures and other forms of life, and the other the most future-oriented one, climate 
change. Finally, the usefulness of the Arctic for testing and developing theory seems lim-
ited because it is surely not ‘typical’ in any normal sense, and thus hard to generalize 
from. Yet it is potentially productive for that same reason: an extreme case can be a de-
manding and sometimes creative challenge to the theory used. 
I am grateful to the authors and especially the editors first for taking the effort to 
explore the potential value of securitization theory for understanding Arctic international 
relations, and secondly for allowing me the opportunity to read, learn from, and comment 
on these interesting articles. 
In this brief postscript, I would like to reflect on three questions. First, what kind 
of total picture emerges from the analyses, i.e. how does it add up to an understanding of 
‘Arctic international relations’ and ‘Arctic security’. And what are the main implications 
hereof? 
Second, some of the theoretical observations and innovations made by the con-
tributors along the way deserve to be identified and evaluated for their potential general 
relevance beyond an Arctic setting.  




Third, although this special issue focuses on two of the three constitute elements of the 
‘Copenhagen School’, securitization and sectors, the third leg – regional security com-
plexes – could play a role.1 
 
Arctic International Politics 
 
The articles in this special issue sum up to a rounded and relevant picture of Arctic Inter-
national Politics to an unusual degree. This is impressive given that they do not have 
survey character and are not mandated to cover each a part of the landscape. Each consti-
tutes a research article with its own clearly delineated case and a particular angle aiming 
to push theoretical and methodological innovation. Nevertheless, they manage to cover 
most of the important dimensions and complement each other in interesting ways.  
Standing on the shoulders of the contributors, I therefore feel enabled to offer a 
kind of integrative take on Arctic International Politics as seen through the lens of secu-
ritization (theory). Naturally, they are not to be blamed for my re-appropriation of their 
analyses, but here comes: 
Security dynamics were, for a while (say: half a century, from the birth of ‘na-
tional security’ as a key concept around 1940 to the end of the Cold War in 1990), cen-
tered on the military security of states. So at least as a matter of conventional courtesy it 
seems reasonable to start the mapping from this sub-set of securitizations and then add 
the other ones. Does the Arctic have a driving dynamic of military security concerns and 
mutual moves of a military nature? No, at most they operate at two ghostly levels: one is 
the underlying frame of a Cold War past that cannot be put fully to rest because it contin-
ues to be a structural underlying speculative reality. The point here is that the whole nu-
clear deterrence ‘reality’ was always a strangely hyper-real one of scenarios that never-
theless became incredible material and real. Because weapon-systems were installed 
partly on the basis of these theories, decision-makers had to – and have to! – react to 
game-theoretical social facts relatively independent of the political relationship (Kahn 
1960; Tunander 1989; Baudrillard 1995; Wæver and Buzan 2010). Given that these nu-
clear systems still have some of their important touch points in the Arctic, the strange, 
ongoing simulations of nuclear scenarios unfold as a constant rumbling beneath the mil-
itary security landscape of the Arctic. Not least the Russian reasonable worry that the US 
missile defense could overturn the basic nuclear constellation is relevant in an Arctic set-
ting due to the continued centrality of radars at Thule Air Base and Russia’s increasing 
reliance on submarines in Arctic waters for its nuclear deterrence. 
The other military security spectre is future oriented and takes the form of spec-
ulative security in a world where climate change has melted much ice, opened new sea 
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how to fit the Arctic into the global map of security complexes (or not). (Åtland 2007; Lanteigne 2016; 
Burke and Rahbek-Clemmensen 2017; Kluth and Lynggaard 2017; Padrtová 2017). 




lanes, and possibly transformed the economics of various mineral and carbo-hydrate re-
sources. As reported by several of the articles in this special issue, most of the sober 
analyses of this issue point to the conclusion that we are not heading for a ‘Scramble for 
the North Pole’ or some similar semi-colonial race for the last ‘white spots’ on the map. 
However, in our current media reality of fake news and cyber capitalism, it is far from 
inconceivable that the self-confirming reward system on telling the most interesting sto-
ries will turn the militarization of the Arctic into a sufficiently real virtuality.  
Still, as argued most systematically in the article by Exner-Pirot and Murray, the 
conditions for military competition are weak in the region – an interpretation which is 
reinforced by the desecuritization story by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg. In sum: a film is 
played in the background about military security in the Arctic, and it matters. Everybody 
has an eye on it now and then, but it is not the driving dynamic in the region. It is more 
of a passive resonance that could be mobilized. Interestingly, as demonstrated by several 
articles here, this scenario of military rivalry has served to elevate many other issues, 
sometimes simply because the military scenarios have contributed to the general valida-
tion of Arctic ‘importance’ in an age of attention competition, sometimes more directly 
by justifying other agendas as a way to re-focus attention. On to other securitizations that 
need to be positioned in relation to this part of the puzzle. 
The next layer should be ‘new security’ issues (or ‘non-traditional security’ if 
you want pre-emptively to adapt terminologically to the near-future where we follow 
Asian leads). What security threats in the environmental, societal, economic, or political 
sectors are mobilized in a situation where military security does not exhaust the imagina-
tion? Here, it is useful to take a transnational perspective. The fact that ‘climate security’ 
is generally elevated in the global hierarchy of security issues has implications in a local 
setting where it is not a given that ‘climate change’ would have a similar prominence if 
looking only at the local power structure. (This need to bring in the transnational factor 
is not about the objective severity of threats because climate change does hit harder in the 
Arctic than most other places. However, if balanced out politically on the local arena, it 
is not given that a securitization of climate change could be mobilized. Probably, it is due 
to the global circulation of the climate issue, that the issue figures high on the Arctic 
agenda as well.) The effects on the regional constellation of climate securitization are 
complicated and contradictory. As argued by Victoria Hermann and others in this issue, 
it empowers Indigenous organizations to speak more strongly on the international arena, 
while at the same time it acts as a driver on the shadow securitization of state-to-state 
rivalry as well. So far, the securitization of climate change has mostly impacted relation-
ships between regional actors and extra-regional ones, i.e. Indigenous actors have mobi-
lized on the global scene but also the states of the region have become more central in 
global climate politics by the Arctic gaining symbolic standing worldwide. However, 
some of the internal tensions in the region that are identified by several authors also run 
down through the climate issue. Especially Nunavut and Greenland as the two most state-
like Inuit polities benefit both from climate change itself (Barkham 2016) and from cli-
mate concerns (eg. through climate tourism), and are able to make at least a case for 




exemption from emission reductions (for reasons similar to developing countries) – while 
also called upon to defend vulnerable communities against it.  
Here, we see strongly the interaction with the other very powerful security issue 
of a non-traditional nature, what the Copenhagen School calls ‘societal security’, i.e. 
groups that defend their identity. Even if it is concretely the same people who are de-
fended, they will appear as a different kind of referent object for security policy if ap-
proached in state terms or non-state, i.e. as a polity or as an identity community, defended 
in the realm of sovereignty and states or in the world of groups and identities . Often it 
will be possible for Arctic actors to coordinate those two layers in relation to the climate, 
because when pointing to threats to culture, identity, and traditional modes of sustenance, 
the most important human addressees for climate change culpability are naturally the big-
gest emitters (as when the ICC sued the US at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights for its climate inaction), not their own states, but the tension is likely to grow more 
evident as both climate change and statehood strengthen. 
The fulcrum of the general constellation seems to be what Jacobsen and Strands-
bjerg discuss in terms of a displacement from horizontal to vertical controversies; inter-
state rivalry has become less threatening due to amongst other things the Ilulissat desecu-
ritization, but this has intensified disputes between the signatory states to that declaration 
and the Indigenous peoples (as well, we might add, some states struggling to achieve high 
enough degrees of arcticness to be involved in political processes).  
Thus, when mapping the constellation of securitizations, it is important to be 
attentive to the simultaneous role of referent objects of many kinds that are often partly 
invisible to the security gaze of each other. When states articulate security, this typically 
has ‘sovereignty’ as defining standard and tends to privilege as (rhetorically admissible) 
threats from other states or domestic political forces, while actors relevant to the sectors 
of societal security and environmental security will not count here. Nevertheless, these 
different securitizations are causally connected so that security relations among states can 
be impacted by security actions taken by other kinds of units, eg. societal defenders of 
identity such as transnational religious movements or even environmental groups. Vice-
versa it is very often the case that those who strive to secure ‘non-traditional’ forms of 
security will have to be attentive to the possibility that they trigger security concerns by 
states. Greenpeace’s #SaveTheArctic campaign is an example of a political project that 
on the surface (!) is a relationship between ‘people’ and Shell and Climate Change, but it 
invariably will affect the interests of states like the US and Greenland (Gerhard et al 
forthcoming). 2 
Concretely in the Arctic, some of the main interconnected securitizations that 
are not easily translated into each other but nevertheless impact each other are the two 
layers of military security – US-Russia nuclear security and potential escalation over ter-
ritorial delineations as well as new patrolling needs – and the politics of climate change 
as such (as a politics over climate actions), plus the spin-off securitization of societal 
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survival for Indigenous communities and settlements and not least the complex political 
security of polities of inbetweenness. The central position in the region of political units 
that are on the move sovereignty-wise makes for very peculiar security dynamics. 
 
It is far from unique that the referent object is not a ‘status’ or ‘being’ but a process. This 
is in various ways also the case for the EU defending ‘integration’, countries defining 
themselves as ‘developing’ and maybe most intriguingly revolutions/revolutionary states 
(Holbraad and Pedersen 2012). However, what is particularly challenging in cases like 
Greenland is that not only Greenland itself has a security referent object that is a process, 
a movement, a direction of change, ever closer to full statehood – this is also accepted by 
the most important other actors including ‘Copenhagen’ (cf. Gad as well as Kjærgaard 
Rasmussen and Merkelsen in this issue; (Adler-Nissen and Gad 2012)). Route, speed and 
destination are unknown, but the direction is not. This means that any calculation of an 
overall equilibrium of stability of the security constellation has to be a mobile one, a 
stability of instabilities, and balance of imbalances.   
As Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen show, the politics on sensitive issues 
(as in their case: uranium) is often shaped by latent securitizations. This is an observation 
that comes naturally when taking a securitization perspective (even if it has not been ex-
ploited analytically as much in securitization studies as it could have been). Given that 
securitization constitutes a breaking out of limitations, a setting-oneself-free to do what 
one deems necessary for survival – an act that often triggers chain-reactions of escalation 
– it is often in the interest of one actor to avoid that another one does so. A given political 
order – not least an international order – will therefore often rest on the main parties 
assessing the ‘red line’ of the other actors in order to avoid pushing them across to actual 
securitization (Wæver 1995a; Wæver 1995b; Wæver 2018) – much like the classical art 
of diplomacy and the Kissingerian concept of ‘a legitimate order’ (Kissinger 1957). 
Therefore, in a constellation that is generally characterized by cooperation and mutual 
adjustment, securitization will often play a role as potentiality, as a move that matters also 
when not made – it matters because it could be made and therefore all parties have to 
consider the what-if of securitization. These mutual considerations of where other actors 
might play the securitization card is part of the overall constellation. 
This all amounts to a security constellation, where the different securitizations 
are interlocking and form a dynamic, structuration-like context for further securitizations. 
(Buzan et al 1998: 166-171, 201; Buzan & Wæver 1997, 2003) The concept of ‘security 
constellation’ is much wider than regional security complexes – the most known ‘rela-
tional’ concept from the Copenhagen School. Regional Security Complexes are units who 
have their securitizations inter-mingled to such a degree that they can’t be handled sepa-
rately, and where this happens in a territorially coherent manner. However, it is possible 
that a number of securitizations interact and condition each other in a way where general 
transnational processes or movements become involved, global issues like climate change 
become part of the constellation, and actors who have their main regional anchorage else-
where get interlinked in a constellation that is in this instance ‘Arctic’. 




Theorizing Securitization via the Arctic 
 
All of the articles do more than make use of (Copenhagen School style) securitization 
theory; they all contribute to it as well.  
In the introduction, the editors talk of ‘cascading effects’ among the different 
securitizations.3 It is not a point that is developed systematically later on in either the 
introduction or any of the chapters, but actually many illustrations can be found in the 
articles. The point that securitization by one actor in one sector often triggers securitiza-
tions by other actors in other sectors is an observation that is made surprisingly rarely 
(given how widespread it is and how straightforward it is to observe it with the help of 
securitization theory). Probably, the infrequency follows from a polarized attitude by 
many securitization scholars to the concept of sectors (military, economic, etc): Either 
you don’t like sectors and organize your work around actors, issues or events, and then 
the cross-cutting dynamics remain unobserved (because you don’t care for those sectoral 
lines they are crossing). Or you emphasize sectors and do a study confined to a particular 
sector, e.g. environmental security or economic security, and then the cross-cutting dy-
namics do not show up clearly either. However, most of the contributors to this special 
issue strike a healthy balance of taking sectors sufficiently serious that they designate 
issues, yet keep the wider perspective.   
This is in my view close to the original impulse behind the concept of sectors. It 
was not meant to support a view of security dynamics being compartmentalized in sepa-
rate sectors – it served to highlight characteristic dynamics peculiar to security of the 
different kinds, i.e. securitization on identity issues (societal security) had particular phys-
iognomies and privileged actors that differ from what you meet when looking at say eco-
nomic security. Therefore, it would very often be most relevant to study political struggles 
or processes cross-sectorally but based on an understanding of the ‘form shaping’ effects 
of the different sectors. Cascading was thus to be expected, but demonstrations and illus-
trations haven’t been as common as expected. This special issue offers quite a few. The 
most consistently illustrated case is probably the one of climate change that impacts all 
kinds of other security concerns relating to societal security, food security, potential geo-
political rivalry and the politics of gradating sovereignty. But the issue also presents a 
link between food security and societal security, as observed by Greaves and Pomerants, 
and between societal security (language policy), economic security and international po-
sitioning in the analysis by Gad. 
Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg organize their analysis around the two interlinked 
conceptual innovations of pre-emptive desecuritization and desecuritization as a shift of 
technique of government. The first is quite straight-forward and hard to meet with any-
thing but acceptance and appreciation. There is an almost structural built-in bias to the 
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same way as their friends. Jacobsen and Herrmann seem to use it in a more sense of securitization in one 
setting and one sector triggers securitization by others in other places and often in other sectors.  




concept of ‘de-securitization’ that it sounds like something that comes after securitization. 
The easy image is one where something has become securitized, and the challenge is then 
what can then be done to shift it out of the security realm and into one that relieves us of 
those particular dangers and drawbacks associated with securitiness, such as undemo-
cratic urgency and exceptionalism? However, it is clearly possible that perceptive politi-
cians sometimes manage to see a securitization spectre arising as did Danish foreign min-
ister Per Stig Møller and others in 2007-8 leading to the Ilulissat Declaration, the consol-
idation of an A5 format and mutual reassurance that the way to deal with territorial rights 
was through international law and geoscience. Pre-emptive desecuritization? Yes, indeed.  
While this is the part of their argument that is politically and practically of most 
far-reaching implications, in academic circles, it is probably more controversial and with 
more wide-ranging implications when they add the argument that the alternative to secu-
ritization was not in this case ‘normal politics’, but rather another ‘technique of govern-
ment’ that was not necessarily closer to ideal politics (law and geo-science). This speaks 
into a long debate; one where -  the authors are right and the original formulation of the 
theory unfortunate. Passages in the ‘Framework book’ and elsewhere can certainly be 
read as equating de-securitization and re-politicization. This should not be held as an au-
tomatic or one-to-one relationship. What de-securitization implies by necessity is only 
that minimum which is implied in the definition: that something is then not dealt with in 
security mode (Wæver 2011). This removes the particular mechanisms that securitization 
trigger including the potentially positive one of focused attention and the negative ones 
of over-writing debate by necessity and installing a relationship of protector-protected. 
What form it then takes instead is an open and separate question. In the literature, 
this has most aggressively (and first) been argued by Claudia Aradau (Aradau 2001) as 
the likelihood that security issues will often instead become dealt with in the modus of 
‘risk’ which entails its own – different but potentially equally strong – shaping effects on 
politics, typically an economistic logic of cost-benefit optimization through expertise. But 
many other forms are certainly possible. Other parts of the Framework book, especially 
the ‘sector chapters,’ point to a set-up where securitization competes with a sector-spe-
cific rationality (market in economics, environmentalism in the environmental sector, 
faith in relation to religion, etc). The book is in tension with itself (or some specifications 
need to be introduced): Securitization competes both with (normal? ideal?) politics in 
general and with sector-specific rationalities. The reason why securitization is contrasted 
to ‘normal politics’ is that one of the effects of securitization is to reduce the possibility 
of politics, because questions of survival can easily be insulated from contestation 
through rhetorics of urgency, loyalty and cohesion. When de-securitization is achieved, 
one particular barrier to politicization has been removed. This does not mean that all such 
have, and the very route of de-securitization can involve the instalment of other mecha-
nisms that are equally strong in hindering politicization, such as logics of expertise, pri-
vacy, efficiency or proprietorship. The analysis by Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg in terms of 
displacement of controversies and techniques of government is a helpful step towards 
correcting this part of the theory. Not least their point that pre-existing formats into which 




the issue can be shifted probably make de-securitization easier while simultaneously mak-
ing ‘normal politics’ more difficult. This shows the necessity to specify more clearly the 
different types of politics involved 1) in the very event of issues moving to or from secu-
rity status, 2) the processes leading into these events, and 3) the ongoing politics ‘inside’ 
situations that are securitized, technisized or riskified, politics that is then always formed 
by that particular speech act but still political (Wæver 2011). 
Greaves and Pomerants contrast ‘adjectival’ use of security language to more 
explicit designation of threat-referent object constellations (cf. McSweeney 1999). It is a 
helpful way to handle what probably confuses many students: we are allegedly looking 
at what people do with ‘security’ and then we have all these domains of ‘food security’ 
and ‘drug security’ that don’t look really securitized. In this context, it is important to 
bring that powerful McSweeney observation back in view that often these ‘adjectival se-
curity’ discourses are really less about existential threats (i.e. the ever-metastazing use of 
that original ‘national security’ move on new fields) and more about domain-specific se-
curity discourses and – according to McSweeney – basically about the more positive as-
piration to satisfy needs in this domain (cf. the more recent debate on ‘positive security’). 
However, it is also worth reminding that what is ‘technically speaking‘ adjectival 
always deserves closer analysis as to whether it is strict securitization in the sense of 
threat-to-a-referent-object or it is a domain of needs to be satisfied, because in many cases 
what is grammatically speaking adjectival will be a confusing meeting point for the two 
kinds, as seen for instance in the cases of energy security and cyber security. Much of the 
literature on energy security is quite confusing because it mixes up ‘security’ in an issue 
specific sense (typically security of supply) with one that links to security in the more 
general sense, i.e. when energy issues arrive on the ‘security agenda’. Similarly, ‘cyber 
security’ has been notoriously confused because the field of computers and networks have 
had its own ‘security’ concerns since the beginning, and until recently the dominant 
meaning was simple integrity and system stability. Over the last decades, more and more 
usages of the term have used security in the sense derived from ‘national security’ through 
the process of widening, and thus in this field too, much of the conceptual literature has 
been about sorting out the interwoven meanings that with some simplification can be seen 
as originating from the two main sources of the field-specific terminology and the general 
security logic. Whereas conceptual analysis can try to clarify these differences, political 
actors naturally utilize the ambivalences and continuities along a sliding scale.  
Clearly, it is possible for a statement to be made in adjectival form and still be 
clear-cut securitization as in the case of the original five sectors from the ‘Framework 
book’, e.g. ‘military security’ or ‘economic security’. The Greaves and Pomerants article 
has found a good way to handle this by checking in each instance whether there is a clear 
threat-defense logic invoked and that should in most cases work. However, my argument 
here about the duality of adjectival security introduces a distinct possibility that one does 
not find the explicit securitization, exactly due to the inherent duality in much of this 
adjectival security. Because of the slidings between the two basis origins of each of these, 
securitization can be done by connotations and vague implications. 




This could be an ironic effect of the ‘excessive success’ of security talk as well as of 
increased reflexivity where there is a growing awareness among practitioners that one 
does something by using security language - not only an implicit, ‘practical’ and ‘tacit’ 
knowledge of how to do it, but increasingly a reflexive, conscious understanding of these 
dynamics. This makes it increasingly viable to get an issue half-way securitized with the 
advantage of not having to spell it out. Similar dynamics can be observed in the US with 
the various instances of a ‘war on …’  drugs, poverty, etc.  
This creates a methodological problem for securitization studies. Concretely, in 
relation to the case study, it means that the findings of Greaves and Pomerants especially 
regarding ‘food security’ as close to actual securitization probably can be strengthened 
one notch. There is more ‘security’ connotations involved than if one had talked ‘food 
security’ 20 years ago, simply because the general idea of widened security has made it 
more likely that the terminology triggers speculation about those threat-defense se-
quences that are maybe less clearly spelled out than they would have had to be in the past. 
Possibly, the concept of ‘human security’ that they observe in the documents could also 
be explored further with an angle like this. 
Hermann’s article is the one that most clearly zooms in on societal security. In 
this case, it is particularly about the defense of the collective identity of Indigenous peo-
ples in relation to climate change, and an important element here is how both the catego-
ries of the threat but also the identity of the referent object and its agency are partly con-
stituted through climate research and risk communication. This opens up for an interest-
ing meeting between two otherwise quite separate if not opposed strands of debate in 
security/securitization theory. On the one hand the ‘soft’ societal security focus on iden-
tities and on the other hand the ‘harder’ interest associated with new materialism and 
Actor-Network Theory in objects and artefacts (Amicelle et al. 2015). While the article 
also involves a meeting between the environmental and the societal sectors, it is a more 
theoretically challenging cross-over to see science and scientific objects in such a central 
role in relation to identity processes.  
Another theoretical point made in this article is that the exact form of societal 
security in this case is neither horizontal competition between two parallel identities, nor 
vertical competition as in conflicts over integration or seccession, but rather about threats 
to the reproduction of identities that work through the demolition of the infrastructural 
‘basis’ for the reproduction of a form of life. This route was mentioned and discussed 
both in the original main book that launched the concept of societal security in the Co-
penhagen School (Wæver et al. 1993) and in the societal chapter in the framework book, 
but it did not make ‘top 3’ in the standard model and has consequently been overlooked. 
It is therefore positive to see this form of societal security dynamic re-analysed with such 
a clear illustration. 
Also Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen make (as did Hermann) interesting 
links between security studies and risk theory. It is both correct and potentially misleading 
when they say that “securitization is nothing but a special case of riskification” and that 
the main difference is that “securitization involves only a certain kind of risks that can 




justify governing through extraordinary means”. Especially the ‘nothing but’ and ‘only’ 
phrasing tends to draw attention mostly to the similarity, not the distinctiveness. Where 
exactly is the specialness – what certain kind of risk is securitization? Naturally, it cannot 
be the threat in itself that has special features; it is a structural property of the narrative.4 
It is an instance of securitization when referent object, securitizing actor, threat etc are 
form a particular pattern that is structured in time with a characteristic rhythm.  
It is a great idea to re-introduce structural narratology (which played a key role 
in the original paper presenting securitization (Wæver 1989), but it invites some compli-
cated theoretical discussions. Greimas’ style semiotics obviously pulls the theory in a 
more structuralist direction, and this seems to be in tension with the other move in the 
article of presenting risk theory as being more sophisticated than securitization theory 
because the former has a differentiated (not monolithic) view of audience. They make the 
point about ‘social theories of risk’ that “what is an object of risk for one actor may or 
may not be a risk object for another” – which they contrast with the allegedly monolithic 
view of the audience in securitization theory. However, the issue is not whether the audi-
ence is monolithic or not, because the audience does not pre-exist the situation, what 
matters is the audience-in-the-situation; and it is not to be decomposed into individuals, 
because focus is the political event of securitization and the audience is those who make 
a crucial difference as to whether the securitizing actor manages to shift the boundary of 
possibility based on a security argument. The audience is exactly a structural position in 
a Greimas-like manner.  
Probably, the ambivalences in the article on this point has to do with the wide-
spread misconception that securitization theory is about communication and perceptions 
– about a securitizing actor making a threat argument to convince an audience. However, 
this sender-receiver model of communication is problematic and the original Austin ver-
sion of speech act theory aims to analyze social acts and events – that which happens in 
and to the modal competencies in a relationship through a speech act. Therefore, the au-
dience is not those listening to a speech – it is the co-producing actor that is necessary in 
order to bring about a transformation of a social situation (in casu a securitization). 
(Wæver 2011; Wæver 2015) 
As the reader has probably already noticed, I have entered more into debate with 
the authors here than in relation to the other articles, and this is a sign that they have made 
a particularly important theoretical move that in my view is important to get more than 
half-right. Much can be gained by deepening securitization theory with the help of the 
structural narratology (and structural semiotics) of Greimas. However, then it is important 
to avoid a step backwards on the concept of audience; backwards both in relation to the 
sophistication achieved in the evolution of Copenhagen School Securitization Theory and 
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paradoxically in relation to the structuralism and formalism of Greimas. Actually, there 
seems to be a very promising correspondence between the relational construction of roles 
according to Greimas and the attention to constitution of relational rights and duties in 
illocutionary speech acts according to Austin’s original version of speech act theory (es-
pecially as re-read by Marina Sbisa; (Sbisà 2007; Wæver 2015)). The defining event in a 
securitization is exactly the rights and duties exchanged between defender and defended. 
Furthermore, Kjærgaard Rasmussen’s and Merkelsen’s idea of ‘securitization 
controversies’ is promising as a way to encapsulate that process that leads to more definite 
outcomes as to both whether and exactly in what form something becomes securitized. 
The term ‘controversy’ will send some scholarly minds off in the direction of ANT and 
‘controversy mapping’, and that is probably an added benefit (Venturini 2009; Venturini 
et al. 2015). 
Gad is in the final article of this issue as always incredibly precise both in his 
own arguments and in his attention to exactly where he deviates from the standard version 
of the theory. He shows convincingly how a securitization analysis of debates over lan-
guage policy in Greenland can generate a more general map of the principled pathways 
for Greenland. Some of the mechanisms in the analysis have striking similarities to the 
one suggested by Kjærgaard Rasmussen and Merkelsen, because it is the relational con-
stellation of identities that organized the insights. The meta-analytical strategy of expli-
cating very precisely what principles and assumptions of the theory are relaxed and for 
what purposes is a generally exemplary observation because it opens for a transparent 
follow up process of loosening and tightening these assumptions and thereby observe 
what they entail. It is fitting for a special issue where the mobilization of a theory has 
proven so productive for development of the theory, that it ends with an article that even 
develops general principles for one way to do such theory development.  
 
An Arctic Regional Security Complex? 
 
The primary Copenhagen School concept for looking at regions is that of ‘regional secu-
rity complex’, and therefore it could have been expected that the special issue would in-
clude such an analysis. Fortunately, it doesn’t because ultimately the Arctic is not a re-
gional security complex. Nevertheless, it might be useful to reflect a little on the ways it 
comes close to and why it is not, and what that means, because this can actually help 
deepen the analysis in this special issue of the regional order, the article by Exner-Pirot 
and Murray that makes use of English School concepts of regional international society 
as primary lens.  
In the original Copenhagen School presentation of the theory as well as the 
global map of regional security complexes (Buzan and Wæver 2003), the Arctic is not 
one of the security complexes. Recently, this has been challenged by several scholars who 
see it as either a mistake already back then or overtaken now by events. (Lanteigne 2016; 
Kluth and Lynggaard 2017) At first, the analyses presented in this special issue would 
seem to support this claim because indeed we find a lot of securitizations in the region 




and they are interconnected, so this does look like a RSC, “a set of units whose major 
processes of securisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security 
problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (ibid: 491). 
However, for theory internal and theory building reasons, Regional Security Complex 
Theory (RSCT) works with the premise that the RSCs are exclusive, i.e. not overlapping. 
It is a way to carve up the world into a map of regions. Thus, the question is whether the 
Arctic is the primary context for the dominant security problems of especially the major 
powers in the region, or it is secondary to their over-arching security dynamics. Here, the 
dominant RSC for Russia remains the post-Soviet one in combination with their partici-
pation in global level security. Similarly, the US is nested in North America and very 
active in global security. Seen from eg. Copenhagen, the main RSC is Europe. Thus, the 
Arctic should not be placed as a RSC. For the states mentioned, it is relatively easy to see 
how the Arctic can be treated as an additional arena where they interact with various 
actors from the same and different RSCs, much like inter-regional dynamics. However, 
the Arctic does raise some additional challenges to RSCT that can’t be solved in the brief 
space here, not least due to the complications that emerge as especially Greenland be-
comes more and more of a state, and its primary security context is the Arctic. Also, the 
involvement of states from several RSCs means that it cannot be analyzed as a sub-com-
plex in one RSC (Åtland 2007). As a temporary solution until this has been worked out, 
let us just notice 1) that the Arctic is not a RSC, and 2) the main players can all be placed 
on the global map in relation to both their own RSC and their relationship to other regions 
as well as the global level.  
Exner-Pirot & Murray present an analysis of the Arctic through the classical 
English School concept of international society, and more specifically the more recent 
concept of regional international societies. A regional international society can differ 
from the simultaneous global one to the point where the same global powers have differ-
ent relations to each other in the regional context than they have elsewhere. This is most 
helpful, especially given that the Arctic can’t be analyzed as a RSC. However, some open 
questions in their analysis might be resolved through linking it to the RSC analysis.  
What is ultimately the mechanisms in the regional international society that en-
ables it to keep relationships among especially the great powers from fluctuating with 
general developments? Can this be achieved purely by normative/institutional means or 
does it demand also a channeling of power political impulses? The English School after 
all is different from American institutionalism both in its more thick constructivist and 
historicist elements but also in the opposite direction by including more realism and 
power politics (Wæver 2017). One element of how this is achieved involves a key role 
for region-specific actors in orchestrating. Possibly, this has some similarities to what was 
called the Nordic Balance during the Cold War. This was not a balance of power between 
either the local states or the superpower, it was a configuration of unexploited possible 
escalation (increased entry into the region), that the Nordic countries across their alliance 
divide could orchestrate to keep both super powers at a relative distance and thus preserve 
the Nordic sub-region as a low-tension area despite the fact that it was a part of a European 




region with a higher level of tension. Similarly, the more local Arctic states need to be 
conscious about the challenge that stems from the great powers regularly having impulses 
that point towards militarization. Exner-Pirot & Murray offer a very helpful list of reasons 
why even the great powers actually have strong interests in cooperation and weak in ri-
valry in the region. However, it is a classical IR insight why such situations often turn 
sour nevertheless; joint absolute gains are often derailed by relative gains logic, even if 
not rational according to a conventional cost-benefit calculation. So, it is important to 
manage quite actively the potential spill-down from global dynamics.  
Enter RSCT. To manage this downward pressure, one needs an analysis of the 
global system and the main regional-global interactions (Wæver 2017). Therefore, even 
if the Arctic is not one of the RSCs; it is important to know those regional and global 
dynamics that drive the main powers. Especially, it is useful to see how the balance has 
shifted from global to regional, and the global structure that has emerged in recent years 
has relatively weak global competitive dynamics, and have the main tensions located at 
the intersection of especially the post-Soviet region and the global level and between East 
Asia and global. This probably explains much of the restraint by great powers in the Arc-
tic, but it is important for Arctic actors to keep up to date with this global analysis to be 
able to channel Great power impulses in the future as well. 
A further premise for a regional international society to work is that the regional 
identity is sufficiently strong. Especially the introductory article by the editors places the 
Arctic in the context of the problematique of region building. As explained in Regions 
and Powers (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48) Regional Security Complex Analysis is com-
plementary to analyses of region-building, the two are not rivalling attempts to do the 
same. Studies of region-building explore how a regional identity gets established and 
consolidated. With some characteristic similarities and differences to nation-building, the 
imagined community of a region gets a social standing that in turn makes it more ‘natural’ 
to do all kinds of concrete things along those lines (Wæver 1993; Wæver 1997). Argu-
ments about culture, history, geography etc. get articulated into a relative strengthening 
of this regional format compared to other affinities. This is complementary to RSCs (and 
security constellations), because they are about the actual interdependences among secu-
ritizations and actors might prefer to see their own region as different from the one that 
is practiced through security interactions, eg. Arab states preferring to see an Arab region 
(and/or an Islamic transnational community), instead of a Middle Eastern region that in-
cludes Israel and Iran, but when mapping interlocking securitizations, one ends up with 
the Middle East. Various region-building projects interact with the RSCs but one is not 
the key to the other; to one it is crucial how actors self-identify, to the other not. A regional 
international society will most likely depend on a regional identity. 
Finally, as I surmised above, the concept from the Copenhagen School vocabu-
lary that might be most productive in this context is the underused one of ‘security con-
stellation’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 201-3; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 51f; Buzan and Wæver 




2009). It is the network of securitizations and desecuritizations, interlinked both ‘inter-
nally’, when one enters the other (“It is a hostile act that they depict us as a threat”) and 
when they interact in a more external, causal manner.  
Four perspectives then supplement each other: region-building, regional interna-
tional society, regional security complex and security constellation. They support each 
other primarily through the following links: region-building explores the extent to which 
regional identity takes shape. This in turn is an important pre-condition for managing a 
regional international society, especially when it is out of synch with Regional Security 
Complexes and therefore unable to develop strong security institutions and/or anchor sta-
bility in the general security outlook of the powers. The regional international society is 
the repository of norms and institutions that limit security rivalry and escalation, but again 
given that main actors are anchored outside the region, a particular task falls upon the 
regional actors in orchestrating figurations that make mutual restraint viable among pow-
ers that have at times a more tense relationship due to developments in other parts of the 
world. The RSC analysis offers a tool to grasp the drivers of powerful external actors that 
need to be orchestrated for the region to remain orderly and cooperative.  
This special issue has demonstrated many ways that securitization analysis of 
the Arctic helps to capture regional security dynamics, but the analysis has also provided 
a productive arctification of securitization theory – a number of innovations that deserve 






Adler-Nissen, R. and Ulrik P. G. (ed.) (2012). European Integration and Postcolonial 
Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and Territories. 1 edition. New 
York: Routledge. 
Amicelle, A., Aradau, A. and Jeandesboz, J. (ed.). (2015). Questioning security devices: 
Performativity, resistance, politics. Security Dialogue, vol. 46(4). London: Sage. 
Aradau, C. (2001). Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization 
Techniques. Rubikon e-journal. 
Åtland, K. (2007). The European Arctic after the Cold War: How can we analyze it in 
terms of security?. Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, FFI-Rapport 200700344. 
Balzacq, T. (ed.) (2010). Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dis-
solve. New York: Routledge. 
Barkham, P. (2016). Greenland: the country set to cash in on climate change. The Guard-
ian, 23.12.2016. 
Baudrillard, J. (1995). Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Glaser. Ann Ar-
bor, MI: University of Michigan Press. doi:10.3998/mpub.9904. 




Burke, D.C. and Rahbek-Clemmensen, J. (2017). Debating the Arctic during the Ukraine 
Crisis – Comparing Arctic State Identities and Media Discourses in Canada and 
Norway. Polar Journal. 
Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2009). Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: recon-
sidering scale in securitisation theory. Review of International Studies, vol. 35, 
pp. 253–276. 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Gerhard, H, Kristoffersen, B and Stuvøy, K. (forthcoming), ‘Green peace or oil riot: Af-
fect, scale and sustainability in the Arctic’. In: Gad, U.P and Strandsbjerg, J. 
Politics of Sustainability in the Arctic. Routledge. 
Holbraad, M., and Pedersen, M.A. (2012). Revolutionary securitization: an anthropolog-
ical extension of securitization theory. International Theory. 
doi:10.1017/S1752971912000061. July. 
Kahn, H. (1960). On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kissinger, H.A. (1957). A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration 
of Peace, 1812-1822. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Kluth, M and Lynggaard, K. (2017). Small state strategies in emerging regional govern-
ance structures: explaining the Danish advocacy for China’s inclusion in the Arc-
tic Council. European Politics and Society, vol. 1, pp.  1–17. 
doi:10.1080/23745118.2017.1347597. 
Lanteigne, M. (2016). Ties that Bind: The Emerging Regional Security Complex in the 
Arctic. NUPI. 
McSweeney, B. (1999). Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Re-
lations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Padrtová, B. (2017). Regional Security Patterns in the Arctic. In: Bourmeistrov, A., 
Dybtsyna, E. and Nazarova, N. (eds.). Management in the High North: Young 
researchers’ contributions - coolection of essays, volume 3, ed. Bodø: Nord uni-
versitet, FoU-rapport nr 3., pp.1-8. 
Sbisà, M. (2007). How to Read Austin. Pragmatics, vol. 17(3), pp. 461-473. 
Tunander, O. (1989). Cold Water Politics. SAGE: London.  
Venturini, T. (2009). Diving in magma: how to explore controversies with actor-network 
theory. Public Understanding of Science. Sage UK: London, England. 
doi:10.1177/0963662509102694. 
Venturini, T., Ricci, D., Mauri, M., Kimbell, L. and Meunier, A. (2015). Designing Con-
troversies and Their Publics. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/DESI_a_00340. doi:10.1162/DESI_a_00340 [Ac-
cessed July 2 2017]. 
Wæver, O. (1989). Security, the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of a Word. Working 
Paper. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. 




Wæver, O. (1993). Culture and Identity in the Baltic Sea Region. In: P. Joenniemi (ed.). 
Cooperation in the baltic sea region. New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 23–48. 
Wæver, O. (1995a). Securitization and Desecuritization. In: R. D. Lipschutz (ed.). On 
security. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46–86. 
Wæver, O. (1995b). Power, principles and perspectivism: Understanding Peaceful 
Change in Post-Cold War Europe. In: H. Patomäki (ed.). Peaceful changes in 
world politics. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI), pp. 208–
282. 
Wæver, O. (1997). The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity? In: P. Joenniemi (ed.). 
Neo-nationalism or regionality: the restructuring of political space around the 
Baltic rim.. Stockholm: NordREFO, pp. 293–342. 
Wæver, O. (2004). Det er hårdt at være stat. Naalagaaffiulluni oqitsuinnaanngilaq (It’s 
Hard to be a State). Sermitsiaq, vol. 33, pp. 31–33. 
Wæver, O. (2011). Politics, Security, Theory. Security Dialogue, vol. 42, pp. 465–480. 
Wæver, O. (2015). The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from Securit-
ization. International Relations, vol. 29, pp. 121–127. 
Wæver, O. (2017). International Leadership after the Demise of the Last Superpower: 
System Structure and Stewardship. Chinese Political Science Review, vol. 2. 
Wæver, O. (2018). Security as Negotiation on the Limits to Negotiability: the careless 
case of Russia relations and the loss of a legitimate security order in Europe. In: 
F. O. Hampson and M. Troitskiy (eds.). Tug of War: Negotiating Security in 
Eurasia. (in press).  
Wæver, O. and Buzan, B. (2010). After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Security Studies. In: A. Collins (ed.). Contemporary Security Studies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 463–501 
Wæver, Ole, Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., and Lemaitre, P. (1993). Identity, Migration and 
the New Security Agenda in Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
